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Abstract
The market economy deals with many interacting agents such as buyers and sellers
who are autonomous intelligent agents pursuing their own interests. One such multi-agent
system (MAS) that plays an important role in auctions is the combinatorial auctioning
system (CAS). We use this framework to define our concept of fairness in terms of what we
call as “basic fairness” and “extended fairness.” The assumptions of quasilinear preferences
and dominant strategies are taken into consideration while explaining fairness. We give
an algorithm to ensure fairness in a CAS using a Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). We
use an algorithm of Sandholm to achieve optimality. Basic and extended fairness are then
analyzed according to the dominant strategy solution concept.
Keywords: fairness, optimality, multi-agent systems, combinatorial auctions, mecha-
nism design
1. Introduction
The term “auction” refers to a mechanism of allocating single or multiple resources to
one or more agents (or bidders) (Conitzer, 2009). In recent years, computer scientists,
rather than just economists, are interested in auctions. The increase in computing power
and improved algorithms have paved the way for combinatorial auctions. Here multiple
items are for sale by the auctioneer and bidders can bid for a bundle of items (also called
packages). In a multi-agent system (MAS), we consider these bidders and the auctioneer as
autonomous agents who act in a self-interested manner in their dealings with one another.
Similarly, even in MAS dealing with resource allocation other than by auction, there are self-
interested autonomous agents (Bredin et al., 2000; Sycara, 1998). We study a framework
where optimality is a desirable property but fairness is a required property. An excellent
example of such a framework is a combinatorial auctioning system (CAS) where the two
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most important issues pertaining to resource allocation are optimality and fairness. A
CAS is a kind of MAS whereby the bidders can express preferences over combinations of
items (Nisan, 2000; Narahari & Dayama, 2005).
We assume in this paper that an agent’s valuation of an item does not change based
on other agents’ private information (i.e., some evidence which affects the valuation of an
agent), that utilities are quasilinear (i.e., utility is linear in terms of money), and that there
are no externalities (i.e., an agent that does not win an item neither cares which other
agent wins it, nor worries about how much other agents pay for it) (Conitzer, 2009). This is
realistic, as seen for example in relation to the Nigerian Communications Commission auc-
tion described below, where, “The decision to charge bidders what they bid was accepted by
bidders and observers as fair and transparent despite the difference in some of the payments
for identical licenses.” (Koboldt, Maldoom, & Marsden, 2003, p. 30) In such scenarios, each
agent holds different preferences over the various possible allocations and hence concepts
like individual rationality, fairness, optimality, efficiency, etc., are important (Chevaleyre
et al., 2006).
We introduce the concept of fairness in the auction mechanism. Although the notion of
fairness is of course well known in general, it does not seem to have been clearly defined with
respect to auction processes in particular. We propose two types of fairness, namely basic
fairness and extended fairness. We explain basic fairness using the concept of equitable
distribution along with the respective preferences. Extended fairness is explained such that
envy-freeness prevails in the allocation and the entire resource is allocated to the winning
bidder. We introduce a fairness table consisting of fair values as perceived by bidders
and auctioneer; this is sealed at the start of the bidding process. We give emphasis to
fairness, unlike the classical approach where revenue maximization is the only goal required
in auctions. To achieve fairness, the proposed algorithm explains a novel payment scheme
which is applied at the end of the bidding process, where we determine the final amount
payable to the auctioneer by the winning bidder. We ensure that this process is considered
to be fair by both bidders and the auctioneer by means of extended fairness. We handle
the special case of a tie in the bidding process using equitable distribution, and ensure
that basic fairness is achieved. The mathematical formulations of fairness concepts in
combinatorial auctions are explained, and a detailed analysis is presented to highlight some
of the properties exhibited by our payment scheme.
In our mechanism, there are self-interested bidders and an auctioneer, who express their
perceptions of the fair value of the resources through a data structure called the fairness
table. Here an auctioneer acts as a facilitator to ensure that an item achieves its fair value.
We consider optimality as the desired property and fairness as the required property. We
illustrate this using a combinatorial auction framework, in which multiple items are simul-
taneously up for sale and a bidder can bid for any bundle of items. The optimal allocation
of resources is discussed using an algorithm of Sandholm where we obtain the winning bid-
ders. The incentives to the winning bidders are provided through the Generalized Vickrey
Auction (GVA) and Algorithm 1. We apply the fairness concept using the fairness table
and Algorithm 1.
The auctioning of the electromagnetic spectrum is one of the well-known applications
of combinatorial auctions. The first-ever combinatorial auctioning of the radio spectrum
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was held in Nigeria in 2002 (Koboldt et al., 2003). A single-round sealed-bid combinatorial
auction (not the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auctions (SMRA) used in other countries)
was conducted for regional fixed wireless access (FWA) licenses; the decision for this for-
mat was made as SMRA was impractical in Nigeria due to its insufficient communication
infrastructure, and as the NCC did not wish to have a lengthy auction. Some 67 out of
the 80 licenses available were allocated, with successful bids amounting to 3.78 billion naira
(38 million US dollars). Here, the complimentarity and substitutability of licenses were the
important factors for choosing a combinatorial auction. The cost of the allocation process
was an important factor, and the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) did not
want to discourage smaller bidders, with its primary goal being efficiency and transparency.
We find in the case of the combinatorial auction conducted by NCC the following prob-
lem: “The final choice of auction design rested heavily on information revealed about the
regional structure of demand from initial applications. It was therefore critical that the ap-
plication process created incentives for bidders to reveal such information.” (Koboldt et al.,
2003, p. 24) This problem is taken care of in our approach as we introduce the fairness table
which is to be populated at the beginning of the auctioning process. This table allows us to
see the regional structure of demands through the fair values assigned to the resources. We
provide higher rewards for bidders who truthfully give their fair values, by Theorems 5.1
and 5.2.
It was also observed by the NCC that bidders defaulted on their winning bids in a signif-
icant number of cases, though not enough to undermine the overall process (Koboldt et al.,
2003). We can decrease the number of bidders defaulting provided we satisfy Theorem 5.2.
This makes it less rewarding for bidders to bid way beyond their capacity, which in turn
decreses the possibility of winning bidders defaulting.
Since the importance here is on transparent and fair allocation, we can apply our method
to ensure fairness in combinatorial auctions. We start with introducing some of the related
work in Section 2. Next, we explain different notions of fairness with formal definitions
in Section 3. This is followed by our study of CAS in Section 4; Algorithm 1 in Sec-
tion 4.4 is used to extend the payment scheme to achieve fairness in CAS with an example.
Section 5 gives a detailed analysis of fairness using mechanism design under quasilinear
settings (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). We conclude with Section 6, which offers some
conclusions about our efforts, and some suggestions for further work along these lines.
2. Related Work
In this section, we review different definitions of fairness as they have been proposed in the
multi-agent literature. The problem of fair allocation is being resolved in various MAS by
using different procedures, depending upon the technique of allocation of goods and the na-
ture of goods. Its welfare implications in different systems were explored by Rabin (Rabin,
1993). Brams and Taylor give an analysis of procedures for allocating divisible and indi-
visible items and for resolving disputes among the self-interested agents (Brams & Taylor,
1996). One of the procedures described by them is the “divide and choose” method of allo-
cation of divisible goods among two agents to ensure the fair allocation of goods which also
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exhibits the property of “envy-freeness,” a property first introduced by Foley (Foley, 1967).
Lucas’ method of markers, and Knaster’s method of sealed bids are described for MAS com-
prising more than two players and for the division of indivisible items. The adjusted-winner
(AW) procedure is also defined by Brams (Brams, 2005) for envy-freeness and equitability
in two-agent systems. Various other procedures like moving-knife procedures for cake cut-
ting are defined for the MAS comprising three or more agents (Brams, 2005; Barbanel &
Brams, 2004).
The auction mechanism proposed by Biggart (Biggart, 2002) provides an economic soci-
ology perspective. There, fairness can mean different things for bidders and auctioneer. The
auctioneer may consider a process fair which in fact only gives him the maximum revenue,
whereas the bidders may consider a process fair which only gives the auctioneer the least
return on all items. The most important consideration overall is to sustain the community’s
faith in the fairness of the process. This does not mean that buyers and sellers cannot press
their advantage, but they are allowed to do so only insofar as the community as a whole
considers their actions appropriate and acceptable.
A concept of verifiable fairness in Internet auctions has been proposed by Liao and
Hwang (Liao & Hwang, 2001). This was to promote trust in Internet auctions. The scheme
proposed provides evidence regarding policies implemented so that the confidence of bidders
increases and they consider it to be fair. Most of these auctions see transparency in the
auctioning process and rules as the basis for ensuring fairness in the system, but clarity
regarding fairness still remains wanting.
The Nash bargaining concept is used by many economists. In Nash bargaining, there is
no particular winner against a bargain. If the amount requested is within the total amount
available at the owner then they get their share, but if the demand is more then they get
nothing. In our case, this is not the case as we have a winner in all circumstances even if
the auctioneer is facing a loss. Also the extended fairness concept is not present in Nash
bargaining to acquire a desired product whereas in our case bidders pay a price to achieve
extended fairness.
The game-theoretic concept of Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) describes the fairest alloca-
tion of collectively-gained profits between several collaborative agents. This is one approach
used in coalitional games. Though this deals with fair allocation, it is restricted to a mech-
anism where the actors contribute in a coalition. The profits obtained are allocated in a fair
manner. The Shapley value is different from our approach, as we do not take into account
prior understanding or coalition among the bidding agents in our discussion.
Fairness as a collective measure has been considered by Moulin (Moulin, 2004), who pro-
poses aggregate or collective welfare which is measured in terms of an objective standard
or index that assumes equivalence between this measure and a particular mix of economic
and non-economic goods which gives happiness to a varying set of individual utility func-
tions. This tries to capture social welfare and commonwealth to be incorporated into every
individuals’ happiness equations. Though debatable, it provides an excellent introduction
to the concept of fairness.
A Distributed Combinatorial Auctioning System (DCAS) consisting of auctioneers and
bidders who communicate by message passing has been proposed (Rasheedi, Chatterjee, &
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Rao, 2009). Their work uses a fair division algorithm that is based on DCAS concept and
model. It also discusses how basic and extended fairness implementations may be achieved
in distributed resource allocation.
The fair package assignment model proposed by Lahaie and Parkes (Lahaie & Parkes,
2009) is defined on items having pure complements or super additive valuations. This model
does not address combinatorial package assignments which involve both complements and
substitutes in general. Their model provides fairness to a “core” which contains a set of
all distributions which are considered competitive—no fairness is posited for other distribu-
tions. Hence the bidders whose distributions lie outside the core do not get the benefits of
fair assessment. In the case of multiple-round combinatorial auctions, for example, bidders
whose bids are not in the core during earlier rounds are not in contention in later ones. This
scheme seems unfair in a fundamental way, as it effectively discriminates against bidders
who cannot make it into the core. In our model only truthfulness in bidding is considered,
and no bidders are distinguished based on whether their bids lie inside or outside a putative
core.
However, the term fairness is defined differently in various MAS with regard to the
resource allocation. In some MAS, it can be defined as equitable distribution of resources
such that each recipient believes that he receives his fair share. Thus, no agent wants
somebody else’s share more than its own share; such division is therefore also known as
envy-free division of resources (Brams, 2005). Thus fair allocation is achieved if it is efficient,
envy-free and equitable (Brams & Taylor, 1996).
3. Definitions of Fairness
Our additional notions of fairness in various MAS are basic fairness and extended fairness.
This section defines the various notions about fairness in combinatorial auctions in a MAS.
3.1 Terminology
Let our CAS be a MAS which is defined by the following entities:
1. The total number of resources is represented by m and the total number of bidders
by n.
2. The set R = {r0, r1, r2, . . . , rm−1} is a set of m resources ri, and 2
R denotes the power
set of R.
3. The set B = {b0, b1, b2, . . . , bn−1} is a set of n bidders bj.
4. a is the auctioneer who initially owns all the resources.
5. A package S is some subset of the set of resources, i.e., S ⊆ 2R.
6. R is the set of real numbers.
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For instance, consider a CAS that comprises three bidders b0, b1, b2, an auctioneer
denoted as a, and three resources r0, r1 ,r2. Each bidder is privileged to bid upon any
combination of these resources. We denote the combinations or subsets of these resources
as {r0 }, {r1}, {r2 }, {r0, r1}, {r0, r2}, {r1, r2}, {r0, r1, r2}.
Example 3.1. A package for a bidder winning the subsets {r0} and {r1} is defined as
{{r0}, {r1}}.
We also consider the concept of weight while assigning the fair value. Here, weight is
not the physical weight but is used as a multiplicative factor for describing the desirability
of the package by the bidder. If a higher weight is assigned to a package, then it will result
in a higher fair value. This expresses the well-known fact that a bidder is likely to assign a
higher fair value to a resource that is desired or needed than to one that is not, even when
the two resources have the same intrinsic value (e.g., a starving man is likely to assign a far
higher value to a meal than to any other commodity of equivalent intrinsic worth).
Definition 3.2. Let us define some important terms used in our later discussion, as follows:
1. The initial value of an item is defined as Ω : B ×R→ R, where Ω(bi, rj) is the initial
amount attached by bidder bi ∈ B to a resource rj ∈ R.
2. The weight a package is defined as Θ : B × 2R → R, where Θ(bi, S) is the weight for
bidder bi ∈ B of package S.
3. The fair value for a resource is defined as Π : B×R→ R, where Π(bi, rj) = Θ(bi, rj)×
Ω(bi, rj) for a bidder bi ∈ B on resource rj ∈ R.
The fair value for a package is defined as Π : B× 2R → R, where Π(bi, S) is the value
obtained as
∑
Π(bi, rj),∀rj ∈ S.
4. The bid value of a package is defined as Υ : B×2R → R, where Υ(bi, S) is the amount
that the bidder bi ∈ B is willing to give in exchange for the package S.
5. The utility value of a package is defined as Γ : B × 2R → R, where Γ(bi, S) =
Υ(bi, S)−Π(bi, S).
6. The package cost is defined as Ψ : B× 2R → R, where Ψ(bi, S) gives the final winning
amount for bidder bi on package S after the bidding has ended.
Assume that the auctioneer and each bidder all have fair values for each of the individual
resources (say, in dollars) as shown in Table 1. Every bidding process will have a base value
initially assigned to an item from where the bidding proceeds. The fair values by a bidder
and an auctioneer for each resource represent their measures of its actual value, and depend
on their weights and their initial values (Definition 3.2). Thus, a bidder is willing to consider
a resource at his fair value. Similarly, the auctioneer is willing to sell a resource at his fair
value. However, bid value may be higher or lower than fair value and hence result in higher
or lower utility values (Definition 3.2) depending on the need of the resource. Fair value
for a combination of resources in the fairness table can be calculated as the sum of the
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Example Fairness Table
Resource r0 Resource r1 Resource r2
Bidder b0 5 8 8
Bidder b1 10 2 8
Bidder b2 10 5 10
Auctioneer a 8 10 15
Table 1: Fair valuations for each resource by all bidders and auctioneer
fair value for each of the resources in that combination (fair values are considered additive
where as the bid values are combinatorial in nature and not additive).
From Table 1, we can see that bidder b0 values resource r0 at $5, r1 at $8 and r2 at $8.
This means that bidder b0 is willing to pay $5 for r0, $8 for r1, and $8 also for r2; b0 believes
that no loss is incurred by the auctioneer in this trade. The fair value for the subset {r0, r2}
for the bidder b0 is calculated as the sum of his the fair values for r0 and r2, i.e., $5 + $8
= $13. Similarly, the fair value for a package is the sum of the fair values of the comprising
sets (Definition 3.2), i.e., for a package {r0}, {r1, r2}, the fair value is the sum of the fair
values of {r0} and {r1, r2}.
A bidder participates in the bidding process by quoting his bid for the packages. Let the
bids raised by the bidders for the individual resource and different combination of resources
be as given in Table 2. It can be seen that the bids raised by each of the bidder for different
sets of resources may or may not be equal to the fair value of the respective set of resources.
This is because the combinations may be complimentary or substitutes.
A bidder is considered to make bid zero for any sets of resources he does not wish to
procure.
Example Bid Table
r0 r1 r2 {r0 , r1} {r0 , r2} {r1 , r2} {r0 , r1 , r2}
Bidder b0 0 10 5 10 20 15 50
Bidder b1 10 5 10 30 0 0 50
Bidder b2 10 0 15 20 30 15 30
Table 2: Bids raised by the bidders for different combination of resources
With this terminology we proceed to explain fairness in subsequent sections.
3.2 Basic Fairness
In many MAS, there occurs a need of allocating the resources in an equitable manner, i.e.,
each agent gets an equitable share of the resources. Such allocations leave the agents with
a feeling that they have received a fair share (Brams & Taylor, 1996). For example, if we
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consider a method that would leave two agents feeling as if they had received 60% of the
good then we would call it equitable. If one felt to be favored and had received 80% while
the other agent believed to have received 60% then it would not be equitable (Brams &
Taylor, 1996). This is quite difficult to access and tends to quite subjective in many cases.
We give a mechanism where this applies only in case of a tie, hence we consider a divisible
resource which does not lose its value upon division and divide it equitably among bidders
in proportion to their assigned weights. Each agent has a set of allocations he deems fair.
An allocation is then is said to achieve basic fairness in resource allocation if all agents
deem it fair.
Each bidder bi wants to maximize his chances of procuring the resource and individual
utility given by Γ(bi, S) represents the satisfaction of obtaining the resource. The most
simple approach is that the satisfaction of a bidder does not depend on other bidders’
satisfactions. The representation below considers that a package S is divisible and can be
divided equitably among n bidders in proportion to their utility values.
The resource can be divided equitably in the ratio: Γ(bi, S)/
∑n
i=1{Γ(bi, S)}, where
weights are set freely by agents.
Definition 3.3. If each bidder bi has a utility for a package S given by Γ(bi, S), and the
package S can be divided equitably among n bidders in the ratio Γ(bi, S)/
∑n
i=1{Γ(bi, S)},
then basic fairness is said to be achieved.
Example 3.4. Consider there to be three bidders for the divisible package S. The bidders’
bid values, fair values and utility values are shown in Table 3.
Utility and Weight Table
Bidder b0 Bidder b1 Bidder b2
Bid Value 24 16 20
Fair Value 18 12 16
Utility Value 6 4 4
Table 3: Example to demonstrate basic fairness
The calculations of ratios are done as shown below.
For bidder b0, 6/14 = 0.43.
For bidder b1, 4/14 = 0.285.
For bidder b2, 4/14 = 0.285.
If the winning amount is $100 then it is divided in the ratio 0.43 : 0.285 : 0.285 to
achieve basic fairness, i.e., bidder b0 has to pay $43, bidder b1 has to pay $28.50, bidder b2
has to pay $28.50.
This method of equitable allocation ensures that all agents deem the allocation to be
fair. Therefore, we say that every agent believes that the set of resources is divided fairly
among all the agents. This concept of fairness is termed as basic fairness.
8
This kind of fairness is required in applications wherein fairness is the key issue, rather
than the individual satisfactions of the self-interested agents. In such applications, it be-
comes necessary to divide a package in an equitable fashion so that every agent believes
that it is receiving its fair share from the set of resources. Hence, we see that every agent
enjoys material equality and this ensures basic fairness among them.
3.3 Extended Fairness
In order to ensure egalitarian social welfare (Chevaleyre et al., 2005), basic fairness is alone
not sufficient. We also need to address envy-freeness (Brams, 2005). Envy-free allocations
result in each agent being at least as happy with its share of the goods as it would be
with any of the other agents shares despite the difference in some payments for identical
goods (Brams & Taylor, 1996; Koboldt et al., 2003). Here, we need to ensure that the
allocation is perceived by all agents to be a fair allocation.
In a MAS, every agent assigns a fair value to each resource that determines its estimate of
the value of the resource in quantitative terms. The fair value attached to each resource can
be expressed in monetary terms in most MAS. Here, the agent believes that the allocated
resource is fair if he receives the entire allocation and the value is according to his fair
estimate.
However, it is important to mention that the fair value attached to each resource by
an agent does not necessarily reflect the bid value of the resource. An agent may hold
a higher or lower bid value for a resource irrespective of the fair value attached to the
resource. Rather, the fair value attached to a resource is an estimate of the actual value of
the resource in the system as perceived by an agent in quantitative terms. It means that
an agent is always willing to trade a resource at its fair value.
Let there be k bidders who bid for a package S. Let each bidder bi and auctioneer a
(who is here only as a facilitator for achieving the items’ fair value) give their fair values in
the fairness table (as in the example in Table 1), which is open for all to see at the end of
the bidding process.
Definition 3.5. Let us define some of the terms used in our discussion.
1. C is defined as the winning amount after the bidding process for a package S.
2. ξ : a× 2R → R defines the fair value of the auctioneer a for a package S denoted by
ξ(S).
3. Π(bi, S) is defined as the fair value of the bidder bi for a package S.
4. The profit denoted by Φ is defined as the net amount C above the fair value of the
auctioneer ξ(S) given by the bidder bi for the package S and is calculated as difference
C − ξ(S).
5. The function distribute is defined as the amount x : B × 2R → R to be given back to
the losing bidders bi who bid for the winning package S.
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6. The value reward is defined as reward : B × 2R → R, where reward = Φ− x.
Now let us define extended fairness in resource allocation.
Definition 3.6. An allocation is said to satisfy extended fairness, if when a winning bidder
bi is allocated a package S: (i) if Υ(bi, S) > ξ(S), then a losing bidder bj is rewarded
Φ×
(
Π(bj ,S)−ξ(S)
ξ(S)
)
; and (ii) if Υ(bi, S) ≤ ξ(S), then no one gets a reward.
Consider the following scenarios:
1. The auctioneer makes a profit more than his fair value assigned initially for that
package S. He distributes the profit among the losing bidders in proportion to their
fair values for that package S as follows:
Let C be the winning bid which is greater than the fair value of the auctioneer, i.e.,
ξ(S). Therefore, Φ = C− ξ(S) by Definition 3.5. The profit to be distributed for each
losing bidder i is calculated by:
distribute
(
Φ×
(
Π(bi, S)− ξ(S)
ξ(S)
))
Now, the incentive for the winning bidder is reward = Φ−distribute
(
Φ×
(
Π(bi,S)−ξ(S)
ξ(S)
))
.
Thus, the auctioneer has obtained his fair value and hence considers this allocation
as fair. All the bidders get amounts according to their fair values, which makes them
envy free.
2. The auctioneer gets a winning bid C which is exactly the same as the fair value ξ(S)
associated with the package S. Now the profit is zero. Therefore, the auctioneer has
obtained his fair value and hence considers this allocation as fair. All the bidders,
though did not get any reward consider this allocation as envy-free as auctioneer too
did not make any profits more than his own fair value.
3. The auctioneer gets a winning bid C less than the fair value ξ(S) attached by him for
the package S. In this case, we try to minimize his loss as follows:
If the fair value given by bidder Π(bi, S) ≥ ξ(S), then bidder bi pays ξ(S). Thus, the
auctioneer has no loss as he gets his fair value and the bidder too is envy free since he
considers that paying his fair value as fair. The other bidders are still envy free since
the amount paid by the winning bidder is more than he actually won in the bidding
process.
If the fair value given by bidder Π(bi, S) < ξ(S) and Π(bi, S) ≤ C, then the payment
does not change and he pays C, else he pays Π(bi, S). Only in this case auctioneer
fails to get his fair value and the bidder does not get the distributed profit amount.
The allocation is still envy-free for all the bidders but not for the auctioneer. This
can be avoided if both bidder and auctioneer remain truthful in their fair values.
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Example 3.7. An example of such a system can be explained with a scenario of auctioning
of a painting. The contending bidders express their fair values through their sealed bids that
is submitted to the auctioneer, i.e., each contending bidder believes that his quotation fulfills
the value expected by the auctioneer and he is a competitive contender for the painting.
We assume here that all bids are truthful. An unbiased auctioneer selects the bid which
is the maximum for revenue maximization and the painting is allotted to him. Here the
auctioneer would distribute the profits among losing bidders when he gets back his fair
value. This takes care of envy-freeness. Hence, the allocation is perceived to be fair by
the winning bidder and by all other bidders as it is allocated to the most deserving among
all the bidders. The auctioneer also perceives this to be fair since he will obtain the fair
value for the resource. Thus all participants perceive the allocation to an agent to be fair
irrespective of the fair values attached by them. Therefore, extended fairness is said to be
achieved.
To make these notions of fairness mathematically precise, we need a framework where
fairness is a required property in resource allocation. However, we also see that resource
allocation deals with another key issue of optimality in various MAS. The best example
of resource allocation framework where both optimality and fairness are the key issues is
Combinatorial Auctioning Systems (CAS).
4. Fairness in Combinatorial Auctioning Systems (CAS)
Combinatorial Auctioning Systems are a kind of MAS which comprise an auctioneer and a
number of self-interested bidders. The auctioneer aims at allocating the available resources
among the bidders who, in turn, bid for sets of resources to procure them in order to
satisfy their needs. The bidders aim at procuring the resources at minimum value during
the bidding process, while the auctioneer aims at maximizing the revenue generated by the
allocation of these resources. Thus, CAS refers to a scenario where the bidders bid for the
set of resources and the auctioneer allocates the same to the highest-bidding agent in order
to maximize the revenue. Hence, we see that optimality is one of the key issues in CAS.
An algorithm of Sandholm is used here to attain optimal allocation of resources. Sand-
holm proposes various methods for winner determination in combinatorial auctions (Sand-
holm, 2002). The search methodology can be used to obtain optimal allocation of resources.
We can represent the Table 2 as a Bid tree using an algorithm of Sandholm (Sandholm,
2002). We can also carry out some preprocessing steps to make the steps faster without
compromising the optimality (Narahari & Dayama, 2005; Sandholm, 2002). Thus we can
determine the winning bidders.
However, besides optimality, another key issue desired by some auctioning systems is
fairness. To incorporate this significant property in this resource allocation procedure, we
propose an algorithm which uses the concept of extended fairness for each agent with basic
fairness in case of a tie and determines the final payment made by the winning bidders.
The algorithm that we describe is based upon a CAS that uses an algorithm of Sandholm
for achieving optimality, and an incentive compatible mechanism called Generalized Vickrey
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Auction (GVA) along with Algorithm 1 as the pricing mechanism that determines the
payments to be given by the winning bidders.
The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) has a payoff structure that is designed in a
manner such that each winning agent gets a discount on its actual bid. This discount is called
a Vickrey Discount, and is defined by (Narahari & Dayama, 2005) as the extent by which
the total revenue to the seller is increased due to the presence of that winning bidder, i.e.,
the marginal contribution of the winning bidder to the total revenue. The GVA framework
requires significant transfer payments from bidders to auctioneer hence a redistribution
mechanism is required to reduce the cost of implementation (Guo & Conitzer, 2009; Cavallo,
2006). Hence, after we obtain winning bidders from the algorithm of Sandholm, the GVA
mechanism can be applied to get Package Cost (Definition 3.2) and Algorithm 1 can be
used for redistribution of payments back to the bidders to achieve fair allocation. We give
mathematical formulations to show that both kinds of fairness can be achieved in CAS.
4.1 Notion of Fairness in Combinatorial Auctions
1. Each bidder and the auctioneer define its fair values in the fairness table (Table 1)
before the start of the bidding process. It is a sealed matrix and is unsealed at the
end of bidding process.
2. An allocation tree is constructed at the end of the bidding process to determine the
optimum allocation and the winning bidders (Sandholm, 2002). Information about
all the bidders in a tie is not discarded using some pre-defined criteria.
3. Calculate the package cost Ψ(bi, Sj) (Definition 3.2) denoted by Pi,j which is the
final winning bid amount for bidder bi on package Sj is obtained after applying GVA
scheme.
4. The fair value of the package won by each bidder is calculated, and the value is denoted
as Qi,j for the bidder bi who wins the package Sj.
5. The fair value of each package is calculated using the fairness table of the auctioneer
and is denoted as Qa,j for a package Sj.
6. The values of Qa,j and Pi,j are compared to determine the final payment by the bidder
which is considered fair.
Now, we propose an algorithm which satisfies extended fairness in all cases, except in
case of a tie.
4.2 Notations Used in Algorithm 1
• bi is an arbitrary bidder i who belongs to the set of bidders B.
• Sj is the winning package with complimentaries and substitutes included, which is a
subset of set R.
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• In general, the Fairness Table for bidder bi and Auctioneer a is defined as shown in
Table 4.
Fairness Table
Resource r0 Resource r1 Resource r2 . . . Resource rm−1
Bidder b0 Π(b0, r0) Π(b0, r1) Π(b0, r2) . . . Π(b0, rm−1)
Bidder b1 Π(b1, r0) Π(b1, r1) Π(b1, r2) . . . Π(b1, rm−1)
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
Bidder bn−1 Π(bn−1, r0) Π(bn−1, r1) Π(bn−1, r2) . . . Π(bn−1, rm−1)
Auctioneer a ξ(r0) ξ(r1) ξ(r2) . . . ξ(rm−1)
Table 4: Fair values for each resource by all bidders and auctioneer
• The fair value function by a bidder bi for a resource rj is given by Π(bi, rj) = d, where
d ∈ N.
• Qi,j is the fair value of resource rj by bidder bi where rj ∈ R and bi ∈ B.
• Qa,j is the fair value of resource rj by auctioneer a where rj ∈ R. Here we consider
only a single auctioneer.
• The package Cost Pi,j (Definition 3.2) for bidder bi obtained from the GVA scheme is
represented as Ψ(bi, Sj).(The package cost is a function of bid values on the bundles
of resources)
• The pay function by a bidder bi is represented as pay(c) is the final payment to be
made to the auctioneer by the bidder bi where c is the bid amount.
• Φ (Definition 3.5) is the net amount above the fair value distributed by the auctioneer
a to the bidders for a package Sj.
• distribute is a function which calculates the amount to be given back to the bidders
who bid for the winning package Sj (Definition 3.5).
• loss is the net amount below the fair value given by the auctioneer to the package Sj .
4.3 Flow of Algorithm 1
In Algorithm 1, we calculate the package cost and the fair values of bidder and auctioneer
given in the lines 1–3. These are calculated in the beginning and are represented as Pi,j ,
Qi,j and Qa,j respectively.
In lines 4–9, we have the first if condition where the package cost Pi,j is greater than
the fair value assigned by the auctioneer for the package Qa,j . If this evaluates to TRUE,
then the bidder pays the amount but the net profit calculated is distributed among all the
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bidders who bid for that package proportional to their bids.
In lines 10–12, we have the second if condition where the package cost Pi,j is equal to
the fair value assigned by the auctioneer for the package Qa,j . If this evaluates to TRUE,
since there is no profit the bidder still pays and there is no amount distributed to the win-
ning package bidders.
In lines 13–32, we have the third ‘if’ condition where the package cost Pi,j is less than
the fair value assigned by the auctioneer for the package Qa,j . If this evaluates to TRUE,
there is a loss for the auctioneer so we try to minimize the loss by checking the additional
cases as follows.
First at line 15, if the fair value of bidder Qi,j is greater than fair value of auctioneer
Qa,j evaluates to TRUE, then the bidder will have to pay only Qa,j . This prevents loss for
auctioneer and also the bidder deems it as fair.
Secondly at line 19, if the fair value of bidder Qi,j is equal to the fair value of auction-
eer Qa,j evaluates to TRUE, then the bidder will have to pay only Qa,j as in the previous
condition. Similar to the previous condition this prevents loss for auctioneer and also the
bidder deems it as fair.
Finally at line 23, if the fair value of bidder Qi,j is less than fair value of auctioneer Qa,j
evaluates to TRUE, then we have to see the additional two conditions as follows.
If the fair value of bidder Qi,j is less than or equal to package cost of bidder Pi,j then
the bidders’ final payment remains the same, i.e., Pi,j .
If the fair value of bidder Qi,j is greater than the package cost of bidder Pi,j then the
bidders’ final payment is Qi,j. These are presented in Algorithm 1.
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4.4 Algorithm to Incorporate Extended Fairness
Data: package cost, fair value of winning bidder, fair value of auctioneer
Result: Final Payment by the bidder
Pi,j ← Ψ(bi, Sj) /* where Pi,j ∈ R */1
Qi,j ← Π(bi, Sj) /* where Qi,j ∈ R */2
Qa,j ← ξ(Sj) /* where Qa,j ∈ R */3
if Pi,j > Qa,j then4
pay(Pi,j);5
Φ← (Pi,j −Qa,j);6
distribute(Φ× [(Qk,j −Qa,j)/Qa,j ]) ; /* among other bidders who bid for7
package Sj */
8
end9
if Pi,j = Qa,j then10
pay(Pi,j);11
end12
if Pi,j < Qa,j then13
loss← (Qa,j − Pi,j); /* Auctioneer can recover as follows */14
if Qi,j > Qa,j then15
pay(Qa,j); /* Bidder’s estimate of fair value is more than Pi,j */16
17
end18
if Qi,j = Qa,j then19
pay(Qa,j); /* fair value is same and Qi,j greater than Pi,j */20
21
end22
if Qi,j < Qa,j then23
if Qi,j <= Pi,j then24
pay(Pi,j); /* Bidder’s final payment remains the same */25
26
else27
pay(Qi,j); /* Bidder’s final payment is Qi,j */28
29
end30
end31
end32
Algorithm 1: Algorithm incorporating extended fairness
4.5 Handling a Case of a Tie—Incorporating Basic Fairness
Unlike traditional algorithms, we do not discard the bids in the case of a tie on the basis
of some pre-decided criterion. We consider these cases in our algorithm to provide basic
fairness to the bidders. In case of a tie, we shall measure the utility value of the resource to
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each bidder in the tie. The utility value of a resource to a bidder is the quantified measure
of satisfaction or happiness derived by the procurement of the resource (Definition 3.2).
The bidders maximize this utility value to quantify the importance and their need for
the resource. Thus, the higher the utility value, the greater is the need for the package. In
such a case, fairness can be achieved if the package S is divided among all the bidders in
a proportional manner, i.e., in accordance to the utility value attached to the package by
each bidder.
Example 4.1. Let us consider the same example to explain the concept of basic fairness
in our system. From Table 2, we observe that the optimum allocation attained through
allocation tree comprises the package r0, r1 , r2 as it generates the maximum revenue of
$50. However, we see that this bid is submitted by the two bidders, b0 and b1.
Thus, we calculate the fair value of the package Sj = {r0, r1 , r2} for the bidder b0 and
b1, i.e., Π(b0, Sj) = 5 + 8 + 8 = $21 and Π(b1, Sj) = 10 + 2 + 8 = $20. Thus, the utility
value of the package S for the bidder b0 and b1 is as follows:
For bidder b0 , Γ(b0, Sj) = 50− 21 = $29, and
For bidder b1 , Γ(b1, Sj) = 50− 20 = $30.
Hence, the package S is divided among bidders b0 and b1, in the ratio of 29 : 30. In
other words, bidder b0 gets 49.15% and bidder b1 gets 50.85% of the package Sj.
The payment made by the bidders is also done in the similar proportional manner similar
to Example 3.4.
The bidders b0 and b1 make their respective payments in the ratio of 29 : 30 to make
up a total of $50 for the auctioneer, i.e., bidder b0 pays $24.65 and bidder b1 pays $25.35
to the auctioneer for their respective shares.
Hence, we see that extended fairness as well as basic fairness are achieved in a CAS using
our approach. We take into account the fair estimates of the auctioneer and the bidders
for each resource to ensure that fairness is achieved to auctioneer as well as the bidders. A
detailed analysis of our mechanism is in the following section.
5. Analysis
Using the solution concept of dominant strategies and mechanism design with quasilinear
preferences, we can analyze the following.
We say that the agents’ preferences are quasilinear when they satisfy the conditions
given below: first we are in a setting where the mechanism can choose to charge or reward
an agent an arbitrary amount. Second, and more restrictive, is that an agent’s utility of a
choice cannot depend on the money that he has, i.e., his value is the same whether he is rich
or poor. Finally, the agents care only about the choice selected and their own payments,
i.e., they are not concerned about monetary payments made or received by other agents.
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5.1 Fairness
We say that extended fairness is achieved when a bidder procures a resource for an amount
that is equal to his estimate of fair value of that resource. In such a case, the bidder
believes that the resource was procured by it at a fair amount irrespective of other bidders
estimate of fair value of that resource. This is according to the last condition of quasilinear
preference. Thus, the allocation is believed to be extendedly fair as per the estimates of the
winning bidder.
We also see that basic fairness is achieved in our system when there is more than one
bidder who has raised equal bid for the same set of resources. In such a case, we divide the
set of resources among all the bidders so as to ensure fairness to all the bidders in a tie.
However, this division of resources set is done in a proportional manner. We intend to divide
the resource such that the bidder holding highest utility value to it should get the biggest
share. To ensure this, we calculate the utility value (i.e., Γ(bi, Sj) = Υ(bi, Sj) − Π(bi, Sj))
of the set of resources to each bidder and divide the set in the ratio of these values among
the respective bidders. Thus, we see that each bidder procures his basic share of the set
of resources in accordance to the basic importance attached by the bidder to the set of
resources. Due to the achievement of fairness through our payment scheme, the bidders are
expected to show willingness to participate in the auctions.
5.2 Higher Rewards
Here we show that a bidder is encouraged to bid higher as he gets rewards proportional to
his bids which are fair.
Theorem 5.1. Given a CAS, a bidder has an incentive to bid higher using the extended
fairness algorithm 1 as he gets higher rewards which are fair provided:
1. the bid value Pi,j is always greater than or equal to fair value Qa,j on package Sj.
2. Qi,j of winning bidder is always greater than or equal to Qi,j of the losing bidder.
Proof. Assume any two bidders bx, by ∈ B who bid for package Sj. Assume values: Px,j, Qx,j
for bidder bx. Py,j , Qy,j for bidder by. Qa,j for auctioneer a.
The first condition is Px,j > Qa,j and Qx,j > Qy,j hence we have a profit Φx which
is distributed in the ratio Φx ×
(
Qx,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
)
to bx and Φx ×
(
Qy,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
)
to by. This gives
proportional as well as fair incentives to bx and by. This also gives a higher reward to bx
since Qx,j > Qy,j.
For notational convinience, let k represent
Qx,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
and l represent
Qy,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
.
The second condition is Px,j > Qa, j and Qx,j > Qy,j hence we have a profit Φy which
is distributed as Φy× k and Φy× l where k, l are constant for bx and by. When Φy > Φx we
see a greater amount of reward is given to higher bidding and hence bidders are encouraged
to bid more.
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Theorem 5.2. Given a CAS, a bidder gets higher rewards using the extended fairness
algorithm 1 if his fair value Qi,j satisfies the condition Qa,j > Qi,j > 2×Qa,j for a package
Sj.
Proof. Assume a bidder bi ∈ B who bids for package Sj and wins it. Assume values:
Pi,j , Qi,j for bidder bi. Qa,j for auctioneer a.
The first condition is when the winning bidder bi has given a a low fair value for a
package Sj intentionally, i.e., Qi,j < Qa,j. Now, his ratio is calculated as k =
Qi,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
which is negative. He has to distribute an extra amount of the same proportion, i.e.,
distribute
(
Φ×
(
2×
Qi,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
))
. Hence, reward = Φ − distribute
(
Φ×
(
2×
Qi,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
))
.
Therefore, bidder has to pay Pi,j − reward.
The second condition is when the winning bidder bi has given a very high fair value for
a package Sj , i.e., Qi,j > 2 × Qa,j. Now, his ratio is calculated as k =
Qi,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
which is
greater than 1. He has to distribute Φ ×
(
Qi,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
)
which is greater than Φ. Therefore,
the extra amount to be distributed would be added to Pi,j and hence ends up paying higher
amount without any rewards.
The third condition is when the winning bidder bi has given a true fair value for a
package Sj, i.e., Qa,j > Qi,j > 2×Qa,j . Now, his ratio is calculated as k =
Qi,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
which
is a proper fraction. Hence, reward = Φ− distribute
(
Φ×
(
Qi,j−Qa,j
Qa,j
))
. Therefore, bidder
bi has to pay Pi,j − reward from definition 3.5.
Clearly, we can see that the maximum reward is possible only in the third condition,
where the fair value is neither too low nor very high. Thus, Algorithm 1 provides higher
rewards if fair value for a package Sj satisfies the condition Qa,j > Qi,j > 2×Qa,j .
5.3 Other Issues
Now let us discuss some issues considering the quasilinear mechanism.
5.3.1 Truthfulness
Consider the following definition by (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
Definition 5.3. A quasilinear mechanism is truthful if it is direct and ∀i, bidder bi’s
equilibrium strategy is Υ(bi, Sj) = Π(bi, Sj).
(Note that (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009) uses vi for what we denote by Π(bi, Sj)
and vˆi for what we denote by Υ(bi, Sj).)
Theorem 5.4. In our mechanism, the bidder bi’s equilibrium strategy is Υ(bi, Sj) =
Π(bi, Sj) so it is truthful.
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Proof. Assume a bidder bi ∈ B who bids for package Sj provides his fair value Π(bi, Sj)
in the fairness table. Let us denote the strategy choosen by bi. i.e., Υ(bi, Sj) = Π(bi, Sj)
to be di which is a dominant strategy as per our assumption (Line 10 in Algorithm 1 and
Theorem 5.2).
Assume that the bidder bi would be better off declaring a fair value Π(bi, Sj)
′ instead of
Π(bi, Sj) to our mechanism. This implies that bi has chosen a different strategy d
′
i instead
of di which is not in equilibrium, contradicting our assumption that di is the dominant
strategy for bi.
This means that here the only action available to an agent is to reveal his private
information. Any solution to a mechanism design problem can be converted into one in
which agents always reveal their true preferences, if the new mechanism “lies for the agents”
in just the way they would have chosen to lie to the original mechanism. Thus the new
mechanism is dominant-strategy truthful (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
In our algorithm the bidder or auctioneer benefit only when they give their fair value
truthfully as in cases where Pi,j > Qa,j and Pi,j = Qa,j , where he gets the incentives as
profits are distributed. But if the fair value is not truthful then he risks going to the case
Pi,j < Qa,j and Qi,j < Qa,j where naturally he is denied of any benefits. Thus if he lies
to the mechanism to gain profits he would not succeed as he would have chosen a strategy
which leads to loss.
5.3.2 Efficiency
Consider the efficiency with respect to the package won by the bidder bi denoted by Sj. We
define S′j as a subset of resources which are not won by the bidder bi.
Consider the following definition by (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
Definition 5.5. A quasilinear mechanism is strictly Pareto efficient, or just efficient, if in
equilibrium it selects a choice Sj such that
∑
iΠ(Sj) ≥
∑
iΠ(S
′
j)
(Note that (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009) uses x for what we denote by Sj.)
Theorem 5.6. In our mechanism, the bidder bi’s equilibrium strategy is to select choice
Sj such that
∑
iΠ(Sj) ≥
∑
iΠ(S
′
j) so it is efficient.
Proof. Assume a bidder bi ∈ B has chosen a dominant strategy di selects a choice Sj such
that
∑
bi
Π(bi, Sj) <
∑
bi
Π(bi, S
′
j). This implies that sum of fair values of items in selected
package Sj, is not more efficient than the sum of items not in package Sj . Thus there is
another strategy d′i which selects a choice S
′
j which is more efficient than Sj(Theorem 5.1).
Hence, di was not in equilibrium as d
′
i is the dominant strategy. This is a contradiction to
our assumption that di was the dominant strategy.
An efficient mechanism selects the choice which maximizes the sum of the agents’ utili-
ties, disregarding the the monetary payments they are required to pay. This can be shown
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in our algorithm concept where the choice is made on the agents’ fair values which helps in
maximizing its profits. Thus, the efficiency is defined in terms of the true fair values and
not the declared value in the bid table (Table 2).
5.3.3 Incentive Compatibility
The combinatorial auction can be made incentive compatible using the Generalized Vickrey
Auction (GVA) and Algorithm 1. The payment using GVA can be explained by assuming
that all agents follow their dominant strategies and declare their values truthfully. Each
agent is made to pay his social cost; the aggregate impact that his participation has on
other agents utilities (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
The payment mechanism described in our system is incentive compatible, i.e., they fare
best when they reveal their private information truthfully in certain cases. As shown in
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 the bidders following dominant strategies in Algorithm 1 is
bound to get higher incentives.
Thus the GVA and Algorithm 1 enables our mechanism to be incentive compatible.
5.3.4 Optimality
Optimality is a significant property that is desired in a CAS. We ensure this property by the
use of an algorithm of Sandholm (Sandholm, 2002) in our system. It is used to obtain the
optimum allocation of resources so as to maximize the revenue generated for the auctioneer.
Thus, the output obtained is the most optimal output and there is no other allocation that
generates more revenues than the current allocation.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that fairness can be incorporated in CAS from our methodology. Extended
fairness as well as basic fairness can be attained through our payment mechanism. Op-
timal allocation is obtained through an algorithm of Sandholm, and the other significant
properties like allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility are also achieved. This is an
improvement because in the existing world of multi-agent systems, there do not seem to be
many studies that attempt to incorporate optimality as well as fairness. The present paper
addresses this lack in a specific multi-agent system, namely, the CAS.
The Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) faced problems in giving incentives
to bidders who divulge their preferences and bidders were not keen on divulging it since
it may lead to more adverse competition. Our algorithm for extended fairness takes care
of this problem as bidders receive more incentives with higher bids. Since the preferences
given by the bidders in the fairness table is confidential and sealed, they need not worry
about their preferences being disclosed to competitors.
The framework described can also be extended in several ways: first is to de-centralize
the suggested algorithm, to avoid use of a single dedicated auctioneer. Especially in dis-
tributed computing environments, it would be best for there to be a method to implement
20
the suggested algorithm (or something close to it) without requiring an agent to act as a
dedicated auctioneer (Rasheedi et al., 2009).
A second important extension would be to find applications for the work. Some ap-
plications that suggest themselves include distribution of land (a matter of great concern
for governments and people the world over) in a fair manner. In land auctions where a tie
occurs, no pre-defined or idiosyncratic method need be used to break the tie; rather, the
allocation can be done fairly in the manner suggested.
A third important extension is to experiment with the grid computing framework (Bapna
et al., 2008). The applicability of fairness scheme in grid computing while allocating re-
sources and its impact on the expected revenue would be an interesting application area.
Fairness is also an important and pressing concern in the computing sciences and infor-
mation technology, particularly, in distributed computing (Lamport, 2000). It is therefore
also of interest to see how our method for achieving fairness could be applied in such con-
texts.
References
Bapna, R., Das, S., Garfinkel, R., & Stallaert, J. (2008). A market design for grid computing.
INFORMS JOURNAL ON COMPUTING, 20, 100–111.
Barbanel, J. B., & Brams, S. J. (2004). Cake-division with minimal cuts: Envy-free proce-
dures for three persons, four persons, and beyond. Mathematical Social Sciences, 48,
251–270.
Biggart, N. W. (2002). Readings in economic sociology. Wiley-Blackwell.
Brams, S. J. (2005). Fair Division. Oxford University Press.
Brams, S. J., & Taylor, A. D. (1996). Fair Division. Cambridge University Press.
Bredin, J., Maheswaran, R. T., Imer, C., Basar, T., Kotz, D., & Rus, D. (2000). A game-
theoretic formulation of multi-agent resource allocation. In Sierra, C., Gini, M., &
Rosenschein, J. S. (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents, pp. 349–356, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain. ACM Press.
Cavallo, R. (2006). Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: Strategyproof redistri-
bution of vcg payments. In Proc. of the 5th Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents
and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS’06), Hakodate, Japan.
Chevaleyre, Y., Dunne, P. E., Endriss, U., Lang, J., Lemaitre, M., Maudet, N., Padget, J.,
Phelps, S., Rodriguez-Aguilar, J. A., & Sousa, P. (2006). Issues in multiagent resource
allocation. Informatica, 30, 3–31.
Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Estivie, S., & Maudet, N. (2005). Welfare engineering in prac-
tice: On the variety of multiagent resource allocation problems. Engineering Societies
in the Agents World, V, 335–347.
Conitzer, V. (2009). Auction protocols. Submitted for publication. To appear as chapter in
CRC Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook.
21
Foley, D. K. (1967). Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economics Studies, 7,
45–98.
Guo, M., & Conitzer, V. (2009). Worst-case optimal redistribution of vcg payments in
multi-unit auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (1), 69–98.
Koboldt, C., Maldoom, D., & Marsden, R. (2003). The first combinatorial spectrum auc-
tion: Lessons from the nigerian auction of fixed wireless access licences. In ITS 14th
European Regional Conference, pp. 1–35, Dotecon Ltd, London, UK. DotEcon.
Lahaie, S., & Parkes, D. C. (2009). Fair package assignment. In Proc. First Conf. on
Auctions, Market Mechanisms and TheirApplications (AMMA 2009).
Lamport, L. (2000). Fairness and hyperfairness. Distributed Computing, 13 (4), 239–245.
Liao, G.-Y., & Hwang, J.-J. (2001). A trustworthy internet auction model with verifiable
fairness. Internet Research, 159–166.
Moulin, H. (2004). Fair Division and Collective Welfare. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.
Narahari, Y., & Dayama, P. (2005). Combinatorial auctions for electronic business. Sadhna,
30, 179–211.
Nisan, N. (2000). Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In EC ’00: Proceedings
of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 1–12, New York, NY, USA.
ACM.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Eco-
nomic Review, 83, 1281–1302.
Rasheedi, L., Chatterjee, N., & Rao, S. (2009). Fair resource allocation in distributed
combinatorial auctioning systems. In Garg, V., Wattenhofer, R., & Kothapalli, K.
(Eds.), Distributed Computing and Networking: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN 2009), Springer LNCS
5408, pp. 212–217.
Sandholm, T. (2002). Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auc-
tions. Artificial Intelligence, 135, 1–54.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value of n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of Games,
II, 307–317.
Shoham, Y., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2009). MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS Algorithmic: Game-
Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge University Press.
Sycara, K. (1998). Multi-agent systems. AI Magazine, 10 (2), 79–93.
22
